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ABSTRACT 
OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY, INTERFIRM MOBILITY 
AND SUBSEQUENT WAGE PROFILES 
MAY 1993 
YOUNG-IL PARK, B.S., HANKUK UNIVERSITY OF FOREIGN STUDIES 
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Robert A. Nakosteen 
This study investigates the job dimension of migrant 
behavior. It presents a model of worker mobility among 
occupations and employers. It is assumed that workers behave as 
if they monitor their expected earnings from continued employment 
in their present positions. Earnings are presumed to be a 
function of variables that describe the worker's productivity and 
prospects for future wage growth. 
Our model consists of six equations. The first two describe 
decisions to change occupations and employers. The dependent 
variables are binary, reflecting the dichotomous nature of the 
decisions. The remaining equations describe wage rates at the end 
of period. While we employ a common wage specification, we allow 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables to differ among the 
four decision regimes. 
Each of the equations includes a random error term which 
captures factors that are known to the decision maker but not 
measured by our data, as well as inherent randomness in the 
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decision process. We permit nonzero correlation among the error 
terms in the decision equations and wage equations. 
This framework gives rise to our three principal items of 
concern. First, we seek evidence on variables that influence 
mobility decisions. Second, we examine the post-mobility wage 
profiles, seeking evidence of discrepancies across migrant 
regimes. Finally, we look for evidence of self selection in the 
mobility decision process. 
We estimate the model with the data collected from the 
University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
Based on the results from wage-gap calculations, it is found that 
within the category of occupational migrants, workers enjoy 
efficient economic returns, although they can be still better off 
by not changing employers than changing (intrafirra transfers and 
promotions). However, it is found that workers who end up with 
the same occupation with different employer suffer from wage 
discrepancy. The evidence of self selection is detected in 
occupational nonmigrants. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation investigates the job dimension of migrant 
behavior. It presents a model of worker mobility among 
occupations and employers. My point of departure is to study both 
occupational mobility and employer mobility using human capital 
framework, hoping to get a better understanding of the 
relationship between labor mobility and subsequent earnings. 
Most current studies on earnings and labor mobility treat 
only one dimension of mobility: either geographical, interfirm, or 
occupational mobility. There are several theoretical reasons that 
support the simultaneous occurrence of occupational and interfirm 
mobility. 
Occupational mobility due to imperfect occupational matching 
may occur because workers have incomplete information about the 
nature of chosen occupations. Complete information may be 
revealed by actual work in that occupation. Alternatively, if the 
costs of entering the primary choice occupation are too high, some 
information may be gained by existence in a closely related 
occupation. Therefore, occupational mobility will be observed if 
there does not exist a good match between the worker and the 
occupation, and often such mobility will also involve interfirm 
mobility. 
Exogenous changes in the market may cause both firm and 
occupation change. If, for example, a firm is going out of 
business and workers are being laid off, some workers will find a 
job in a new firm, which may also involve working in a new 
occupation. This is likely to happen if the reason that forced 
the firm go out of business also caused a drop in the demand for 
skills specific to the occupation. 
Individual worker’s career plan can cause interaction 
between occupational and interfirm mobility. Individual workers 
can move along a career line which is divided into several stages 
during a career. Occupational mobility can be observed as a 
worker's career plan unfolds. This type of mobility can take 
place within the firm or among firms. 
Most research on investment in human capital and labor 
mobility distinguishes between two types of human capital: general 
and firm-specific human capital. This distinction captures only 
one dimension of human capital specificity. Specificity has many 
dimensions. Skills are not always general or firm specific, but 
often times occupation specific. Analysis of occupational and 
interfirm mobility can introduce not only general and firm- 
specific human capital but also occupation-specific human capital. 
This study is primarily concerned with simultaneous 
treatment of occupational mobility and interfirm mobility, and 
their effects on the subsequent earnings profile. It presents a 
model of worker mobility among occupations and employers. This 
study focuses on workers' decisions to relocate among occupations 
and employers. We assume that workers behave as if they monitor 
their expected earnings from continued employment in their present 
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positions. Earnings are presumed to be a function of variables 
that describe the worker’s productivity and prospects for future 
wage growth. During each period the worker faced a pair of 
decisions: whether to remain in his present occupation and in his 
present firm. We observe the worker at the end of the period and 
record that he has changed both occupation and employer, changed 
either occupation or employer, or remained intact. 
Our framework gives rise to three principal items of 
concern. First, we seek evidence on variables that influence 
relocation decisions. Second, we examine the post migration wage 
profiles, seeking evidence of discrepancies across migrant 
regimes. Finally, we look for evidence of self selection in the 
migrant decision process. 
The organization of this study is: Chapter II provides the 
literature review which will present the theoretical background 
and empirical findings on labor mobility and earnings. 
Chapter III describes the econometric model and estimation, 
data and specification. The chapter starts by suggesting some 
preliminary reasons for simultaneous treatment of occupational 
mobility and interfirm mobility. We present a model of six 
equations. The first two describe decisions to change occupations 
and employers. The dependent variables are binary, reflecting the 
dichotomous nature of the decisions. The remaining equations 
explain wage rates at the end of the period. While we employ a 
common wage specification, we allow the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables to differ among the four decision regimes. 
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Estimates of these profiles permit us to make inferences 
concerning the effect of migration decisions on wage rate 
subsequent to the move. 
Each of the equations includes a random disturbance term 
which captures factors that are known to the decision maker but 
not measured by our data, as well as inherent randomness in the 
decision process. We do not restrict these unobservables to be 
independent of one another. Instead we permit nonzero correlation 
among the error terms in the decision equations and the wage 
equations. Evidence of significant covariation between errors in 
the decision and wage equations would be indicative of self 
selection in the migration process. This would suggest that 
individuals are characterized by unobservables which 
simultaneously affect both their propensities to migrate and their 
post migration wage rates. 
We employ a two-stage estimation procedure to estimate the 
model. The first step is to estimate the two decision probit 
equations, from which we estimate appropriate selectivity terms 
for both occupational and interfirm mobility. In the second 
stage, we use OLS method to fit log wage equations with relevant 
explanatory variables and the calculated selectivity terms. 
The model will be estimated with data from the University of 
Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The sample 
contains 3,087 heads of households who were employed for money 
during the 1986 survey and 1987 survey. The operational 
definition of employer mobility is that employer in 1986 is 
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different from the employer in 1987. Occupational mobility is 
defined as a change in two-digit PSID occupation classification 
code in the survey of 1986 from the one reported for the 1987 
survey. 
Chapter IV presents analysis of sample data and the results 
of model estimation. In the first section, we analyze the 
patterns of worker's mobility to look for possible interactions 
between occupational mobility and employer mobility. In addition, 
we analyze descriptive statistics to have a clear picture of 
sample data. In the second section, we present the results and 
explanation of all model estimations. 
Finally, Chapter V includes an overview and the conclusions 
of this study. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON LABOR MOBILITY AND EARNINGS 
Recent studies in labor economics have generated a sizable 
literature on the determinants and consequences of labor mobility. 
Labor mobility has been defined from different perspectives such 
as geographical relocation, ■*- interfirm mobility, interindustry 
mobility and occupational switching. In this chapter, I will 
restrict my review of previous studies of labor mobility to 
interfirm mobility and occupational mobility. 
Section one will deal with interfirm mobility and earnings 
and section two with occupational mobility. 
A. Studies on Interfirm Mobility and Earnings 
It is not simple to categorize the literature on employer 
mobility and earnings due to the wide variety of methodologies 
applied to a number of different populations. Indeed, throughout 
this literature, there is no consistent characterization of 
mobility. While many of the studies distinguish between voluntary 
mobility (quit) and involuntary mobility (layoff), this is not 
universally true. Regardless, I have chosen the type of model 
employed in the studies as my basis for categorizing this broad 
literature. 
^-For geographical mobility, refer to the literature review 
in Greenwood (1975, 1985). 
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Perhaps the most frequently used model in this literature is 
the log wage regression with mobility probit. Another frequently 
used model is a wage regression with a mobility dummy variable. 
Finally, a number of studies perform two separate regressions of 
wage and mobility, assuming that each is independent of the other. 
This section is divided into subsections according to these 
primary types of models used in the study of earnings and 
interfirra mobility. 
1. Models of Log Wage Regression with Mobility Probit 
Borjas and Rosen (1980) view labor turnover as a sorting 
process which occurs as a result of mismatches in the existing 
allocation of workers to firms. These mismatches can be 
attributed, in part, to imperfect information and mobility costs. 
Accordingly, they view labor turnover as necessary and productive, 
since it serves to increase the efficiency of the labor market, 
and thereby increases labor productivity, total wage income, and 
the total value of output. Recognizing that a worker's past 
investment decisions affect that worker's separation decision, 
while at the same time the worker's likelihood of separation has a 
feedback effect on his or her incentive to invest, Borjas and 
Rosen use a three-stage estimation procedure to estimate log of 
the wage change equation. 
Using The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Young Men 
for the 1971-75 period, their first stage is a reduced form probit 
estimation of observable employee characteristics, such as 
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education, tenure, experience, geographic location, industrial 
sector, and socioeconomic indicators. Among these estimates, 
prior job tenure has the strongest effect on the probability of 
separating from the current job; it has a strong negative and 
decreasing effect. Education is also found to have a significant 
effect on interfirm mobility, while the effect of general labor 
market experience is insignificant. 
Borjas and Rosen then test their hypothesis by obtaining 
selectivity corrected imputations of the gains from staying and 
moving, and showing that the probability of separation depends on 
the expected gains from mobility. By performing log wage growth 
regressions on their selectivity bias calculated from reduced 
probit estimates, they find that prior job tenure has a negative 
effect on subsequent wage growth. The authors attribute this 
effect to the fact that longer tenure with a previous job results 
in higher wage levels in that previous job, thereby reducing the 
effect of the prior job in determining the initial earnings after 
a job change. Experience and education is not significant at a 
conventional level of significance. In addition, they find that 
job changers, on average, experience a larger gain from employer 
separation than stayers would have obtained had they moved. 
Similarly, stayers experience larger gains from staying on their 
jobs than changers would have obtained had they stayed. 
While most studies of longitudinal data are limited to 
estimates of short-run wage changes, Blau and Kahn (1981) attempt 
to determine whether mobility-induced wage changes are transitory 
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or lasting. Using data from 1970-1972 NLS data for young women 
and 1969-1971 NLS data for young men, the authors create four 
further subsamples - white male, white female, black male, and 
black female. The additional subsamples allow them to focus on 
the differential effect of sex and race on voluntary mobility. 
For each group, the Blau and Kahn estimate a probit model 
for quit probabilities. The estimated effects of earnings 
variables such as long-run earnings opportunities, current wage, 
and a dummy variable for industry group are large, negative, and 
significant for all four groups. While coverage by a collective 
bargaining agreement is large, and negative for all groups, this 
estimate is not significant for black females. Similarly, the 
quit probability declines significantly with tenure for all four 
groups. However, white males in white-collar jobs and black males 
in the basic industries are more likely to quit than their 
counterparts. For white females, relatively more education and 
being married are associated with higher quit probabilities. 
By fitting change in log earnings regressions, Blau and Kahn 
analyze the returns to quitting. Recognizing the endogeneity of 
quits, they use instruments calculated from the first-stage probit 
estimations, and report only the quit coefficients. When this 
instrumental variables approach is used to account for sample 
heterogeneity, Blau and Kahn find that quitting improved both the 
current wages as well as the long-term earnings prospects for all 
groups, with the improvement in long-term earnings prospects 
exceeding the gain in the current earnings. 
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In his study of mobility wage effects, Antel (1986) 
criticizes the approach of Bartel and Borjas (1981) and Blau and 
Kahn (1981), by arguing that their simple comparison of mover wage 
profiles with stayer wage profiles incorrectly assumes that 
quitting is exogenous. Rather, Antel states that firm-specific 
skills are costly and since employees cannot transfer these skills 
to new employers, employees specialize in firm-specific training. 
Consequently, the false assumption that quits are exogenous 
produces a downward bias on mobility wage effects. Citing the 
small or insignificant positive wage effects for young males found 
by both Bartel and Borjas (1981) and Blau and Kahn (1981), Antel 
hypothesizes that a simultaneous estimation structure with job 
change as an endogenous variable will produce significantly larger 
mobility wage effects. 
Antel performs maximum likelihood estimates of log wage 
change with reduced form probit estimates of quits using employee 
characteristics such as wage, tenure, experience, education, 
health status, union status, and industrial sector on 1969-1970 
NLS data for young men. Using this revised methodology, the 
typical and expected negative effect of wage, tenure, union 
status, and health coefficients on the probability of quit; the 
insignificant effect of experience and education on the 
probability of quit; and, the positive relationship part-time 
status and the probability of quit are all confirmed. 
In addition, the coefficient of the quit-tenure interaction 
indicates that tenured quitters do not exhibit wage gains below 
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the gains of less tenured job changers. Experience shows a 
significant negative effect on wage growth while change in 
experience between wage observations is significant and positive. 
However, in contrast to most previous research, Antel's 
estimate of wage growth after a voluntary job change is large and 
significant; voluntary mobility significantly increased wages. 
Antel attributes this notable mobility effect on wages to his 
endogenous treatment of voluntary mobility. Furthermore, to test 
the endogeneity of quits and sample selection, Antel performs a 
single equation OLS regression on quit. By comparing this result 
with his simultaneous equation maximum likelihood estimation of 
the quit coefficient, Antel concludes that treating quit as an 
exogenous variable underestimated mobility wage gains by about 
half. 
Criticizing OLS log wage regressions, Marshall and Zarkin 
(1987) specify a model for the joint determination of firm's wage 
offer and the employees mobility decision. This joint 
determination is based upon their model of the employee-firm 
relationship as a contract in which the firm is repeatedly making 
a specific wage offer in the current time period to the employee 
for the next time period's wage. Whenever the offer falls below 
the worker's reservation wage, the employee makes an employer- 
separation decision. 
Specifically, Marshall and Zarkin use the 1970-1971 NLS for 
young men. They model the log wage offer for period t as a 
function of worker characteristics in period t-1. The log 
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reservation wage is specified as a function of worker 
characteristics and search and mobility costs in period t-1. It 
is assumed that the disturbances in these equations are jointly 
normally distributed. Consequently, this leads directly to a 
first-stage probit specification for the mobility decision. These 
results are then used to calculate selectivity correction terms 
that are included in second-stage offer equations for stayers and 
new hires. 
Marshall and Zarkin find that the probability of a separation 
decreases at a decreasing rate with tenure, decreases with 
education, and increases with prior mobility. The probability of 
separation is also significantly lower for married workers. 
However, after controlling for marital status, the level of a 
wife’s income has a negligible effect on the separation 
probability. 
The second-stage wage results attribute all wage growth to 
experience. The coefficient for tenure, though very imprecise, is 
actually negative, while the experience effect is essentially 
linear with a 3.7-3.8 percent increase in wages per year for both 
new job and current job offers. The large and positive 
coefficients for the selectivity terms suggest that employee 
behavior is consistent with income-maximizing search. 
To examine the effect on subsequent earnings of an worker's 
separation from either their employer or their industry, Nakosteen 
and Zimmer (1988) estimate a model of two dimensional mobility. 
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With a consideration of self selection, the model estimates two 
mobility decision probits and a log wage regression using the 
Social Security Administration's One Percent Continuous Work 
History Sample (CWHS) data set. 
Among the estimates from reduced bivariate probit, they find 
that both the duration of the employees experience with the 
current employer and the tenure of residence were both strong 
deterrents to separation. As age increases, they find that 
industry separation decreases at an increasingly moderate rate. 
While older workers are more likely to separate from their 
employers and women are less likely to separate from either their 
employer or their industry, race does not have a significant 
effect on employer separation. 
The results from second-stage wage equations selectivity 
terms draw attention. Within a category of double movers, workers 
who possess unmeasured tendencies to move industries also enjoy 
unmeasured earnings advantages to be exploited by moving. Based 
on their further analysis, Nakosteen and Zimmer conclude that 
employer nonmigrants enjoy more efficient returns on their 
predetermined earnings. Workers who separate from both their 
employers and their industries generally suffered the largest 
earnings losses. 
Antel (1991) uses the 1979-81 NLS data set of young men to 
investigate the relationship between the length of the 
unemployment spell and the new wages of employer changers. 
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Specifically, Antel tests the hypothesis that the search and 
mobility costs associated with unemployment between jobs are 
compensated by the increased wage gains that result from a more 
intensive job search. 
Using a reduced-form mobility choice equation to estimate 
mobility, the probit coefficient estimates are consistent with the 
results of previous studies (Antel, 1986). For example, Antel 
finds that high-wage, tenured, union, and health limited workers 
are less likely to quit; education and experience do not have a 
significant effect on an employee's quit probability, while part- 
time workers are more likely to quit. Among wage change 
estimates, schooling has an insignificant effect on wage change, 
while wages increase at a decreasing rate as experience increases. 
Antel concludes that firms do not seem to view unemployed 
workers as less fit for hiring than currently employed workers. 
Accordingly, the cause of separation, either a voluntary quit or 
an involuntary layoff, did not appear to affect an employer's 
likelihood to hire an unemployed applicant. The major finding 
from this study is that an unemployment spell between jobs is 
associated with wage gains higher than those obtained when the job 
change was made with no intervening unemployment, thereby 
supporting the theory that a worker's mobility decision is a cost- 
benefit optimization behavior. 
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2. Models of Wage Regression or Mobility Regression 
Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) use panel data on mobility and 
wages to ascertain the extent to which human capital investments 
are linked to either general labor market experience or current 
tenure. They define current tenure as the tenure with the current 
firm, or firm-specific tenure. To control for heterogeneity, they 
introduce two measures of previous mobility: the number of 
previous job changes, and the number of years in which the job 
changes occur. While specific job tenure remains an important 
determinant of mobility, supporting the specific human capital 
argument, its influence is much smaller if these two measures are 
introduced. A similar argument, with similar empirical results, 
is also applied to the observed positive relationship between wage 
and specific job tenure. These results are particularly 
interesting since the addition of the mobility term to the OLS 
log-wage regression produces a result that is not consistent with 
the specific human capital theory. To explain their surprising 
results, the authors tentatively conclude that general human 
capital investments account for only one half of the total 
positive effect of specific job tenure on wages, that specific 
investments account for about one fourth of this effect, and that 
the remaining effect can be explained through interfirm mobility 
acting as arbitrage activity. 
Bartel and Borjas (1981) conduct an analysis of wage growth 
and the wage gains from mobility job mobility. Consistent with 
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human capital theory, they attribute wage growth across jobs to 
individual search and mobility investments less the loss of 
specific training caused by employer separation. Similarly, wage 
growth within a job is attributed to both general and specific 
human capital investments. Two effects of job mobility are 
examined: the effect on differential life cycle wage growth 
between jobs of origin and destination; and the influence on life 
cycle wage growth in any given job. Bartel and Borjas’s analysis 
of the 1969-1973 NLS data set for younger and older men produces a 
number of interesting results. First, they find that mobility has 
a significantly different effect on the wage growth of young men 
versus older men. The greater gains associated with the mobility 
of young men reflect the differential role of turnover between 
these two groups: the search investment aspect of turnover in 
discovering a career, as well as the relatively greater value that 
younger men place in finding a conformable job. In comparison, 
the mobility of adult workers typically has a greater element of 
surprise, such as an unanticipated plant closing. While the 
latter selectivity effect is not precisely modeled by Bartel and 
Borjas, they conduct some simple tests of the panel data which 
strongly suggests that the selectivity effect is not the most 
important source of variation. Instead, the effects of turnover 
on wage growth vary with the cause of turnover, with layoffs 
tending to reduce subsequent wage growth and quits tending to have 
either a positive or a smaller negative effect on the subsequent 
wage growth. 
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Second, the authors examine wage growth within a given job 
spell, predicting that greater expected tenure should result in 
greater investment and therefore greater wage growth. Their 
results suggest that employees with longer job spells exhibit 
greater life cycle wage growth. 
Finally, the time series aspect of the panel data set allows 
Bartel and Borjas to distinguish between the general and firm 
specific experiences of the employees identified in the cross- 
section data set. The results show that specific training is an 
important component of life cycle wage determination, since 
individuals with greater specific-firm experience had greater 
life-time wage growth. 
To determine the returns to interfirm job changes. 
Mincer(1986) estimates not only the short-run wage change, but 
also performs a separate estimation of longer-run wage changes. 
Mincer defines the short-run wage change as the difference between 
the starting wage on the new job and the wage earned on the old 
job one year earlier, while the longer-run wage change is the 
difference in the wage between the two jobs at the same tenure 
level, controlling for experience. By distinguishing between 
short-run and longer-run wage changes. Mincer measures the extent 
of any shift in the tenure-wage profile that results from an 
interfirm job change. 
In his samples of white male nonstudent workers of age 60 or 
less. Mincer distinguishes experienced workers from young workers. 
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defined as those with less than 10 years of experience. In 
addition, according to their type of separation. Mincer further 
divides those workers who experience interfirm mobility into the 
quitter and the laid-off. Other employee characteristics included 
as independent variables are education, marital status, and union 
membership. 
Across both experienced and young workers. Mincer finds that 
wage growth decreases at a decreasing rate with experience and 
tenure. In addition, changes in the adult male unemployment rate 
significantly affects the change in the real wage, with recent 
changes in the unemployment having a much stronger affect than 
less recent changes in the unemployment rate. 
The estimation of shorter-run wage gains to interfirm job 
changes shows that for the average separation the wage gain after 
a job change does not exceed the wage gain resulted from staying 
with the same firm. Moreover, the wage gain for experienced 
workers whose interfirm mobility is caused by a layoff is even 
less than the wage growth of comparable stayers. Across all 
workers, the wage gains of quitters exceed the small or even 
negative wage gains of laid-off movers. Finally, the gains from 
separations for all workers decline with age (experience). 
The results of long-run estimations are quantitatively 
similar to the short-run gains. For younger movers, the long-run 
gains are numerically larger than the short-run gains, which 
suggests that these employees move onto a higher wage growth path 
with their new firm. 
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Unlike most previous research which examined the average and 
transitory change in earnings between male employer stayers and 
employer changers during the first one or two years after an 
employer change, Ruhm (1987) examines the variance in earnings 
changes for both men and women in the five-year period following 
an employer change. 
Ruhm finds that separation has a more clear and definitive 
impact on men's earnings than on women’s earnings. Men who 
voluntarily left their employers enjoy a 10.5 percent faster wage 
growth than stayers, while men who involuntarily left suffer a 
13.6 percent slower wage growth. Although the losses resulting 
from involuntary job turnover are transitory for various groups of 
employer changers, such as longer-tenured men, much of the wage 
loss persists for several years. Conversely, the wage decline for 
quits is quite large and lasting, typically persists for several 
periods. 
Based on panel data from Denver (DIME) and Seattle Income 
Maintenance Experiments (SIME), Mortensen and Neumann (1989) 
provide empirical evidence on the returns to interfirm mobility by 
examining the effects of various forms of job-specific 
investment^. In their descriptive analysis of the data, Mortensen 
and Neumann find that about 60 percent of all job changes occurred 
without an intervening spell of either unemployment or labor force 
^Three specific versions of job-specific investment focused in the 
theoretical literature on mobility are job search, job matching, 
and on-the-job training. 
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withdrawal, while about 50 percent of the employer changes by 
women involved no spell of nonemployment. 
On average, both male and female employer changers receive a 
higher wage on the new job. However, a surprisingly large 
fraction of the employer changers actually receive a wage cut. 
For example, 37 percent of the male and 36 percent of the female 
employer changers in Denver experience a wage cut. In addition, 
34 percent of males and 32 percent of females experience wage 
cuts. Overall, a substantial fraction of individuals who moved 
directly to a new employer experience a wage cut. In Denver, 32 
percent of the male workers and 30 percent of the female workers 
changing their employers without any intervening period of 
unemployment experience a wage cut, while the comparable 
percentages in Seattle sample are 29 percent of the men and 25 
percent of the women. Based on this somewhat surprising 
information, the Mortensen and Neumann conclude that the simple 
view of the prevailing on-the-job search models are not adequate 
for underlying assumptions for labor turnover. To explain the 
large numbers of employees experiencing wage cuts, they suggest 
that job matching and/or specific human capital acquisition are 
important factors in the labor turnover process. 
One conspicuous empirical pattern that emerged in both their 
raw data and regression analysis is that job transitions involving 
a spell of unemployment or nonparticipation result in wage that, 
on average, is about 5-6 percent less than the wage of individuals 
who moved directly to a new a job. Finally, through regression of 
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current wage on demographic characteristics, previous earnings, 
and the existence or non-existence of an intervening period of 
unemployment, Mortensen and Neumann find that very little of the 
variance in wages can be explained by personal characteristics 
such as age, education, or the level of previous earnings. More 
specifically, length of time on the previous job has no effect on 
subsequent earnings. 
3. Summary 
There appear conflicting results on the mobility-earnings 
profiles. Some studies show small or insignificant positive or 
even negative wage effects (Bartel and Borjas, 1981; Blau and 
Kahn, 1981; Mortensen and Neumann, 1989), other studies present 
significant positive wage effects (Antel, 1986). In their 
descriptive analysis of data where a large fraction of job 
changers actually received a wage cut, Mortensen and Neumann 
(1989) even suggest that job matching and/or specific human 
capital frameworks are better fit for turnover process. 
When the effects of job change on wage are analyzed in both 
the short-run and long-run, short-run wage gains to interfirm job 
changes show that the wage gain after a job change does not exceed 
the wage gain resulted from staying with the same firm. The wage 
gain for experienced workers whose interfirm mobility is caused by 
a layoff is even less than the wage growth of comparable stayers. 
(Mincer, 1986). In comparison of short-run gains with long-run 
gains, the long-run gains are either numerically greater than 
21 
short-run gains (Blau and Kahn, 1981) or quantitatively similar to 
the short-run gains (Mincer, 1986). 
In the studies of quitting and earnings, it is generally 
found that quitting induces a large and positive gain in earnings 
This gain has been most notable in young male quitters (Antel, 
1986). However, when a distinction is made between quitting and 
layoff as the cause of the job mobility, the absolute magnitude of 
the net positive gains from quitting exceeds even the absolute 
size of the net negative loss from layoffs. In general, layoff 
tends to reduce subsequent wage growth and quitting tends to have 
either a positive or a smaller negative effect on wage growth. 
The employee's tenure on the previous job had a negative 
affect on the likelihood of separation from the subsequent 
employer, and also had a negative or insignificant effect on the 
subsequent wage growth of movers. In addition, as current tenure 
increased, the wages of stayers within a firm increased and 
interfirm mobility decreased. This result supports the theory of 
specific capital investments. 
Amongst the employee characteristics most frequently used in 
the literature, the overall rate of employer separation is higher 
for women, nonunion employees, employees without health 
limitations, employees with relatively less education, and part 
time workers. Although very few studies include age in their 
wage regressions, the employer separation rate tends to vary 
inversely with age. However, there is no significant evidence of 
age/earning relations in the current literature. Finally, while 
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experience was generally found to have an insignificant affect on 
employer separation, most studies invariably showed a positive and 
concave relation between earnings and labor market experience. 
Studies which also analyze the growth rate of wages generally 
found a higher growth rate for white men, employees with 
relatively more education, and residents of small towns. 
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B. Studies on Occupational Mobility 
Although income growth is commonly associated with upward 
occupational mobility,3 economists have paid relatively little 
attention to an individual’s propensity to change occupations. 
Instead, the literature has, for the most part, focused on 
occupational choice and disregarded life time occupational 
changes. More generally, studies of occupational mobility can be 
classified into three main areas: (1) descriptive studies 
conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; (2) on-the-job 
training, occupational mobility, and earnings; (3) and 
determinants of occupational mobility. 
In the previous section, job-search and the job-matching 
theories of mobility attributed much of the relationship between 
wages and occupational or interfirm mobility to the higher 
productivity achieved by a better job-match. But since an 
implicit cause of the increased income that accompanies upward 
occupational changes is the increase in employee skills as well as 
the returns to those skills, this section will review the human 
capital investment and occupational mobility literature. 
1. Studies by Bureau of Labor Statistics 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics has conducted numerous 
analyses on occupational mobility trends using data from the 
3Some examples of upward mobility sequences are: technician 
to engineer to manager; laborer to operative to craft worker; 
receptionist to secretary to administrative assistant. 
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Current Population Survey (CPS). For example, Rytina (1983), 
Seghal (1984) and Carey (1988)4 use this data set to analyze the 
rate of occupational mobility. This section summarizes some of 
the more notable relationships that have been identified between 
personal characteristics and occupational mobility. 
The occupational mobility rate declines sharply with age. 
The reasons for the high rates of occupational mobility among 
young workers are numerous. For example, upon the completion of 
school, young persons often try several fields of employment 
before settling into a career. In addition, as young employees 
change their residence, they may also change occupations. In 
contrast, occupational change amongst older workers occurs less 
frequently because of attachments to a particular occupation and 
the concomitant risks of losing income, job security, and pension 
rights which frequently accompany an occupational shift. 
Compared to the age differentials in occupational mobility, 
the gender differences are small. For both men and women, 
mobility rates decrease with age. However, women have a slightly 
higher rate of occupational mobility. This may reflect their 
shift into professional and managerial occupations as well as 
their presence in clerical jobs, where the rate of occupational 
change is traditionally been high. 
Similarly, occupational mobility rates do not differ much 
according to race or ethnicity. For men, the rate of occupational 
4Rytina (1983) uses Current Population Survey (CPS) of 
January 1981, Sehgal (1984) CPS of January 1983, Carey (1988) CPS 
of January 1987. 
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mobility is slightly higher among Hispanics, but this can be 
explained by the comparatively younger age distribution of 
Hispanics in these studies. For white women, the occupational 
mobility rate is higher than that for either black or Hispanic 
women, and this difference is present across most age groups. 
Finally, both occupational tenure and employer tenure are 
closely associated to age. Among workers aged 35 to 44, more than 
one-third had been with the same employer for ten years or more, 
and among workers 45 and over, nearly one-third had been at their 
jobs for at least 20 years. 
Unlike the previous studies, Markey and Parks' (1989) 
summary of workers' movement between occupations differentiates 
between voluntary and involuntary change of occupations.^ Their 
findings show that age is the most significant predictor of 
voluntary mobility, with 92 percent of all workers making an 
occupational change less than 45 years of age. Second, higher 
levels of education are generally associated with higher rates of 
voluntary mobility. However, very specific training, such as 
specific professional training, reduces occupational mobility. 
Third, career change - such as a simultaneous occupation and 
employer change by a person with significant job tenure - is not 
common. Fourth, involuntary occupational changes often lead to 
lower pay in the new job. 
^They analyze the CPS data of January 1987 which collect the 
reasons for changing occupations to permit an examination of the 
motivations behind occupational switches. 
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2. On-the-Job Training, Occupational Mobility and Earnings 
Emphasizing a job applicant's demand for on-the-job learning 
opportunities in selecting amongst potential employers, Rosen 
(1972) provides a model of labor markets that suggests an explicit 
mechanism relating occupational mobility and employee age-earning 
profiles. Specifically, Rosen characterizes the labor market and 
the contract established between suppliers and demanders of jobs. 
Rather than simply "selling” a job to workers, Rosen describes 
firms as the sellers of a "package deal" which includes learning 
possibilities. These learning possibilities can also be described 
as personal human investment opportunities. Since learning 
opportunities can increase an employees marketable skills and 
future income, workers demand and pay for these learning 
possibilities through wage differentials. 
However, the eguilibrium price for the "package deal" also 
depends upon the firm's financial cost of providing the same 
learning opportunity to different employees. That is, the cost 
varies according to differences in each employee's learning 
capacity. Thus the wage differentials and the prices of learning 
from jobs are implicit, since they must act to balance the net 
advantage of alternative job opportunities. 
Rosen formalizes the relationship between on-the-job 
training and occupational upgrading through an explanation of the 
dynamic interaction between profit maximizing firms and 
individual's attempting to maximize their lifetime wealth and 
profit-maximizing firms. He describes an optimal progression up 
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an occupational hierarchy over the course of an individual's 
working life. Occupational upgrading is related to occupational 
investments such as formal education and on-the-job training, by 
improving the capacity to learn in a particular job, they increase 
the speed with which an individual can progress between jobs. 
Rosen concludes that the relation between earnings and work 
experience depends upon the real costs of providing learning 
options, the distribution of workers ability and education, 
initial capital endowments, access to capital markets, labor 
market restrictions and discrimination, and rental values on 
knowledge or skills. 
More importantly, he demonstrates that the process for 
acquiring labor market skills will involve an optimal sequence of 
jobs, in which each job has a successively smaller increment of 
investment. From his model, it follows that over time the 
differential between worker's gross and net (of opportunity costs) 
earnings will shrink, until each workers investment process is 
completed and gross and net earnings are equalized. It is clear 
that within this general framework, some measure of post-school or 
on-the-job investments in human capital must be a fundamental and 
integral component of any possible explanation for differences in 
either individual life-time or cross-sectional earning profiles. 
In order to estimate the relationship between post-school 
human capital investments and upward occupational mobility, both 
Leigh (1976a) and Shaw (1984) offer a model of the process of 
acquiring productive job skills. Each cites Mincer's book 
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entitled Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, the weakness in his 
formulation of the theory of post-schooling investment, and the 
difficulty in estimating the effect of an unobservable worker 
characteristic such as on-the-job "training". Nevertheless, each 
provides an improved specification of the Mincer’s job experience 
variable, and then estimates the relationship between on-the job 
human capital investments and wage growth. 
According to Leigh (1976a), Mincer's use of the number of 
years of work experience as a proxy for post-school investments is 
inadequate since it fails to capture the variety, intensity, or 
rate of each employee’s investment experience. As an alternative, 
Leigh proposes observed upward mobility in a job hierarchy as his 
proxy. He develops his proxy by first modeling the impact of 
personal characteristics on the determination of the level first- 
job occupation, then examining the determinants of occupational 
advancement through the current job. Finally, he examines the 
effect of both initial occupation level and occupational change on 
current wages. 
Thus, Leigh uses occupational advancement to measure job 
progression, and to focus on the process of occupational mobility 
during the working lifetime as well as the impact of this mobility 
on earnings. Using the 1966 NLS data set for both black and white 
men aged 45-59 with a record of a first job and who were working 
in 1966, Leigh obtains a number of hypotheses for the wage 
differentials across race. In addition, his analysis suggests 
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both initial individual’s occupation and occupational change 
should be strongly and positively related to his hourly wage 
rates. 
Shaw’s (1984) proxy for general human capital investments is 
based upon her hypothesis that the intensity of this investment 
varies by occupation and that a portion of these learned skills 
are transferable to other occupations. This hypothesis allows her 
calculate an individual’s occupational investment at any time 
using that individual’s history of occupational choices. Her 
definition of occupational investment is the accumulation of 
skills that an individual acquires in order to perform within an 
occupation. Thus, her approach to measuring experience allows her 
to introduce heterogeneity in a worker’s experience. 
After developing exogenous measures of these features, she 
uses 1966-1975 NLS data set for young men to calculate the 
occupational investment of 1447 employees. Using this 
occupational investment calculation in the earnings specification, 
Shaw finds that the occupational investment variable is a 
significant and robust determinant of earnings growth, dominating 
the effect of experience variable. 
A later study by Shaw (1987) adds an analysis of the process 
of joint employer-occupational change to her previous analysis of 
the intensity of human capital investment and the transferability 
of occupational skills across occupations. By developing proxies 
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for investment intensity and skill transferability, she avoids the 
standard reduced form estimation of demographic determinants of 
occupational change, which she hypothesizes as independent of past 
occupational experience. Instead, she performs a direct 
estimation of a structural model of occupational change. 
Her results indicate that a 25 percent increase in skill 
transferability will increase occupational change for a 29 year- 
old man by 11 percent, while increasing the probability of change 
for a forty year-old man by about 23 percent. If follows that 
individuals consider the alternative returns to their occupation- 
and employer-specific skills while making employer and 
occupational decisions. For example, workers with a large 
quantity of skills, such as craft workers, may continually change 
employers to maximize the return to their occupational skills. 
She concludes that individuals do change occupations to maximize 
the present value of their returns to investment. 
Wilson and Green (1990) investigate the importance of 
occupation and occupational change in determining real labor 
income. This study is significant in that it attempts to combine 
aspects of both job-search theory and on-the-job specific human 
capital investment theories in its explanation for earning-profile 
differentials. This is done by including both personal 
characteristics and firm-specific human capital in their study of 
the changes in real earnings both in absolute terms and relative 
to an income distribution over time for a selected sample. 
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In this study, Wilson and Green use an instrumental 
variables technique to address the interdependence between 
turnover and changes in earnings. Their results show the 
importance of this interdependence as well as the importance of a 
variety of personal factors including measures of human capital, 
marriage, disability and geographic mobility on yearly changes in 
real income. Their results also show that occupation effects on 
earnings increments, especially in white-collar classifications, 
retain their significance even when adjusting for the other 
influences. In addition, their study of year-to-year changes 
within the overall distribution of real labor income reveals the 
strong association between occupational mobility and real labor 
earnings in both absolute terms and relative to an income 
distribution. 
3. Determinants of Occupational Mobility 
Drawing upon the dual labor market theory as well as Rosen s 
theory of an optimal progression up an occupational hierarchy, 
Leigh (1976b) questions whether structural demand-side barriers 
exist which limit the occupations and lifetime earnings of young 
white and black men. 
In this study, Leigh questions the extent to which racial 
differences in occupational advancement can be attributed to 
differences in formal education and training. Secondly, he 
questions the importance of structural labor market segmentation 
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factors in determining occupational mobility.6 Finally, he 
examines the effect of inter—firm mobility on upward occupational 
mobility. 
Defining occupational change as the difference between 
occupational standing in 1965 and 1970, Leigh finds, first, that 
occupational advancement is positively related to the length of 
schooling, although that correlation is much weaker for black men 
than for white men. Second, participation in various vocational 
training programs is positively and comparably correlated with the 
occupational mobility of both whites and blacks. Finally, 
structural factors, such as initial industry or the region of 
residence, have little or no effect on the occupational mobility 
of either group. Despite the relatively weak correlation between 
education and occupational mobility for black men, Leigh concludes 
that the occupational advancement of blacks can be enhanced by 
continuing the long-run process of increasing their relative 
endowments of education. 
In a study of the occupational mobility in Britain, Mayhew 
and Rosewell (1981) describe and explain the extent and causes of 
occupational mobility. The authors decompose job changes into the 
following constituent parts: occupation, status, county and 
industry changes, and examine the extent and spread of mobility on 
n 
the Hope-Goldthorpe scale. 
6Data used in this study are collected from The 1/1000 Public 
Use of Sample of the 1970 Census. 
^The Hope-Goldthorpe scale is developed by Goldthorpe and 
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Although their results provide a satisfactory explanation of 
the levels of Hope-Goldthorpe achievement, they cannot adequately 
explain the movement along the scale. Using discriminant 
analysis, the independent variables are used to explain the 
reasons for upward moves, downward moves, or stays. Based upon 
this analysis, the authors conclude that education and background 
have a small but significant affect on occupational mobility. 
The effect of education on different types of occupational 
mobility has been analyzed by Sicherman (1990).8 The focus of 
this analysis is on "career mobility", upward occupational 
mobility along a series of occupations that forms a worker's 
career. Their results show that, on average, more educated 
workers are less likely to change occupation. This may be due to 
their relatively larger amount of occupation-specific 
investment as well the smaller number of distinct occupations for 
careers requiring more education. Across individuals with the 
same initial occupation, however, more educated workers are more 
likely to move to a higher level occupation. This is true both 
within the firm (promotion) as well as across firms. Finally, for 
Hope. It ranges from 18 (self-employed workers such as street 
vendors and jobbing gardeners) to 82 (self-employed professionals 
such as doctors, lawyers and accountants) and is a measure of the 
desirability of occupation/status combinations. 
8The data set used for the empirical analysis is drawn from 
PSID. Individuals reported their occupations at the time of 
survey, or if unemployed, the last occupation held. Occupational 
change is defined to occur when the 2 digit PSID occupational 
category reported by the worker in two successive surveys,is 
different. 
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occupations with a smaller correlation between schooling and 
wages, employees with more education are more likely to moving to 
experience upward occupational mobility. 
In a follow-up study, Sicherman and Galor (1990)9 analyze 
the role and significance of occupational mobility in the labor 
market. By focusing on individual careers, they analyze the 
effect of schooling on career mobility, wages and the possibility 
of promotion, the relationship between quitting and career 
mobility, and the duration effects on career mobility. Their 
analysis shows that career mobility is more likely to occur within 
a firm (promotion) than across firms for individuals with higher 
levels of experience. Moreover, within the same firm, tenure has 
a positive effect on career mobility. However, among workers who 
were not promoted, those with a higher probability of promotion 
are more likely to quit the firm. 
4. Summary 
Despite its important implications for income growth and 
labor market adjustments, only a handful of research has done in 
the area of occupational mobility. Much of the existing research 
interprets occupational changes for economic-based reasons as 
signals of upward job mobility, which often implies career¬ 
upgrading, and assumes the voluntary nature of occupational 
9The authors use the same data set and same definition of 
occupational mobility used in Sicherman (1990). 
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mobility. The findings that emerge from this literature review 
can be summarized as follows: 
1. Transferability of occupational investments tends to be 
positively related to occupational mobility (Rosen, 1972; Shaw, 
1984, 1987). 
2. Occupational mobility affects earning increments (Wilson and 
Green, 1990), and both initial occupation and occupational change 
have a positive relation with wage rates (Leigh, 1976a). 
3. Age is the most significant predictor of voluntary occupational 
mobility. As the age of a worker increases, the likelihood of his 
or her experiencing occupational mobility decreases.1^ Similarly, 
the longer an employee has been attached to a particular employer, 
the less likely the employer is to change occupations. 
4. On average, more educated workers tend to be less mobile. But 
within the same initial occupation, more educated workers are more 
likely to move to a higher level occupation, within or across the 
firm (Sicherman, 1990). As experience increases, career mobility 
is more likely to occur within the firm than across the firm 
(Sicherman and Galor, 1990). Distinguishing voluntary and 
involuntary occupational change, the ability to accumulate 
marketable skills is one likely determinant of voluntary 
occupational change.H 
•^This age/mobility relationship can be explained using 
human capital theory, which focuses on individuals and their 
efforts to increase their value in the market place. Simply 
stated, workers consider any action they may take to improve 
their earnings potential. 
11Sehgal (1984) use the terms "push" or "pull” factors in 
occupational mobility and Sicherman (1990) planned or unplanned 
transitions between occupations. 
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CHAPTER III 
ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURES AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
A. Econometric Procedures 
1. Preliminary 
As was noted in the literature review, most of current 
studies on earnings and labor mobility treat only one dimension of 
mobility, that is, either interfirm mobility or occupational 
mobility. One exception is Nakosteen and Zimmer (1988)12 where 
they examine simultaneous effects of employer separation and 
interindustry migration of workers on the their subsequent 
earnings. 
Workers switch their occupations and employers either 
voluntarily or involuntarily. Their reasons of labor mobility may 
come from job matching, occupational choice, market conditions, 
and planned career path, among other factors. 
Occupational mobility due to imperfect occupational matching 
may occur because workers have incomplete information about the 
nature of chosen occupations. Complete information may be 
revealed by actual work in that occupation. Alternatively, if the 
costs of entering the primary choice occupation are too high, some 
information may be gained by closely related occupation. 
Occupational mobility will be observed if there is not a good 
•*-2The data (CWHS) used in their study lack important 
personal characteristics such as educational level, experience and 
tenure which closely represent human capital. They use lagged 
earnings as a proxy for earnings capacity of workers. 
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match between the worker and the occupation, and often such 
mobility will also involve employer separation (see Table 4.1 and 
4.2 on occupational and employer mobility). 
Upon completion of school, young persons often try several 
fields of employment before settling into a career. In addition, 
as young employees change their residence or living arrangements, 
they may change occupations and/or employers. 
Exogenous changes in the market might cause both firm and 
occupational change. If, for example, a firm is going out of 
business and workers are being laid off, some workers will find a 
job in a new firm, which will also involve working in a new 
occupation. This is likely to happen if the reason that forced 
the firm to go out of business also caused a drop in the demand 
for skills specific to the occupation. 
Interaction between interfirm and occupational mobility can 
be caused by individual worker's career plan. Individual worker 
plans to move along a career line,13 which is divided into several 
stages during a career. Sometimes the tasks performed in the 
different stages of this line fall into different occupational 
categories. Occupational mobility is observed when this occurs. 
This type of mobility can take place within the firm or among 
firms. 
Viewed in this context, it seems more appropriate to analyze 
simultaneous effects of employer separation and occupational 
13Spilerman (1977) defines career line as a worker history 
that is common to a portion of the labor force. Sicherman and 
Galor (1990) define it as a career path. 
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mobility on subsequent earnings, because employer separation 
interacts intimately and frequently with occupation mobility. 
2. Theoretical Background 
The economic theory of occupational choice suggests that 
workers, through their career, tend to enter or stay in an 
occupation which provides the highest expected returns14 on their 
stocks of human capital. The nature of labor market is such that 
the number of occupations available to a worker within a single 
firm is limited. Hence, the individual worker who behaves to 
maximize his expected lifetime earnings might engage in interfirm 
mobility as well as occupational mobility. 
This study starts with simple matching and specific human 
capital theory. At the beginning of his employment, a worker does 
not have complete information about his occupation and employer. 
The employer is also not informed completely about his employee. 
Thus the worker’s productivity and the employer's reward are 
initially uncertain. But the degree of uncertainty will diminish 
with the worker's tenure in the firm as a consequence of repeated 
observations. 
During his tenure in a particular occupation, if the match 
is satisfactory, the worker may accumulate not only occupation- 
14The returns could be either economic or noneconomic. 
Economic returns include a stream of likely income from entry into 
a given profession, likely promotion opportunities, fringe 
benefits, and job security as well as the opportunity costs. 
Noneconomic returns include working conditions, job satisfaction, 
support of coworkers, and availability of adequate materials and 
equipment. 
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specific human capital but also firm-specific human capital. 
Consequently, the worker’s wage capital along with specific human 
capital acquired on the job increase with tenure relative to the 
offers on alternative jobs, which implies that the propensity to 
separate diminishes over time. 
An unsatisfactory match between the worker and his 
occupation may cause the worker to switch his occupation and 
possibly to change his employer simultaneously. In this case, the 
worker might begin period two with a new employer. 
Consider a two period model in which worker i is employed 
with an initial occupation in a firm. At the end of period two, 
he might have switched occupation, or changed his firm, or both. 
At the end of period one, the worker possesses a total stock 
of human capital which is partitioned into portions that are 
specific to the occupation, the firm, and a general component: 
Hid) = Hoi(l) + Hfi (1) + CJ( 1) (1) 
#_£ (1) denotes total human capital possessed by an individual 
1 at the end of period one, and H0±(1) and Hf±(1)denote specific 
human capital related to an occupation and a firm, respectively. 
The last term G^(l) represents general portion of human capital, 
which can be transferred across occupations and firms as well. 
At the end of period two the worker will possess a revised stock 
of human capital: 
H,(l) = Hol (2) + Hfi(2) + 0,(2) (2) 
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The two selection rules of occupational mobility and interfirm 
mobility result in four decision regimes. If the worker remained 
in the original position, he would accumulate the amount of 
specific human capital related to both occupation and firm 
equivalent for additional time spent there, and thus all 
components of H±(2) should be greater than those of Hi(l). If the 
worker changed both occupation and firm, he could not accumulate 
both firm-specific and occupation-specific human capital. Thus 
the resulting condition would be H0±(2)=0, Hf±(2)=0 and 
G±(2)>G±(l). If the worker changed occupation only, he could 
accumulate only firm-specific portion of human capital, and thus 
H0±(2)=0, Hfi(2)>Hf±(1) and Gi(2)>Gi(l). If the worker changed 
firm only, only the occupation-specific portion would be 
accumulated, and then Hf±{2)=0, H0± {2) >H0± (1) and Gj (2) >G_f (1) . 
Based on the four decision regimes, the second period wage 
equations would be restructured as one of the following 
functions: 
= Y\Y \ + €b if HJ1) > Hol(l), Hjs(2) >HjS(I) (3) 
frl ^2 = ^2^2 +e2> if = 0, Hfl(2) >Hfi( 1) (4) 
= r3y 3 + f3> ifHfi(2) =0, HtxQ.)>Hoi(X) (5) 
lnfr4 = yaY 4 + £4, if HJ2) = 0, Hfi(2) = 0 (6) 
where Y denotes a vector of predetermined variables; y denotes 
unknown parameters; and the f's are unobserved random disturbance 
•^■^Wage equation follows log-wage form by Mincer (1974). 
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terms. The underlying assumption in equations (3)-(6) is that a 
worker’s earnings capacity is proportional to his stock of human 
capital. 
3. Econometric Model 
In this study, we have three principal items of concern. 
First, we look for evidence on variables that influence worker's 
decision to change occupation and employer. Second, we examine 
the relationship between mobility and subsequent wage profiles, 
seeking evidence of discrepancies across migrant regimes. 
Finally, we look for evidence of self selection in the worker's 
decision process. 
The model requires a sample of workers at two points in 
time. We observe a worker over time to determine whether he has 
experienced occupational change and/or employer separation. We 
observe his wage at each point, along with a vector of 
predetermined variables. The endogenous variables in the model 
are the mobility status indicators and second period wage. Our 
model consists of two mobility status equations , along with the 
wage equation corresponding to each of the four mobility 
categories. 
Define I*oi and 1^ as latent indexes of worker i's propensity 
to switch his occupation and to separate from employer, 
respectively. The mobility decisions can be a function of log 
wage and other explanatory variables. For worker in our 
random sample, we have 
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(7) 4 = albify + fixa + 4 
Ifi - a2 fi + £fi (8) 
where the a*'s are unknown scalars and /f's are unknown 
coefficient vectors for exogenous variables. The e's are 
disturbance terms, distributed normally with zero means and 
constant variances. Worker i experiences occupational mobility 
and interfirm mobility, respectively, if 4>0 and Otherwise 
no mobility occurs. We do not observe 4 and ffi . Instead we 
observe the dichotomous variables I and /. which indicate the ex fi 
outcomes of the two selection rules. We classify workers in the 
original sample as follows: 
>f i'oi> o 
otherwise 
(9) 
if C>o 
otherwise 
(10) 
Equations (7) and (8) together with (9) and (10) jointly 
comprise the structure of the model. The two decision rules 
subdivide the sample into four groups of workers: workers 
experiencing neither employer mobility nor occupational mobility 
(Sj: Ioi-0r those experiencing occupational mobility but 
not employer mobility (S^: I0±~1/ If±-0); those experiencing 
employer mobility but not occupational mobility (Sj: 0, 
Ifi~1); those experiencing both occupational mobility and employer 
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mobility (S^i ^ol Yf±=1)* In the remainder of this chapter, 
the subscript i will be suppressed for notational convenience. 
Allowing for this convention, the equations (3)-(6) are refined as 
the following unconditional actual wage equations for workers in 
subgroups Sj, S2, S3 and S4: 
InJTi = riYt + £i3 (ID 
In ^2 = Yiy2 + (St) (12) 
In^3 = 3 + ^3> (S,) (13) 
In ^4 = + £4, (S4) (14) 
In equations (11) through (14), y's are vectors of 
exogenous variables, y*s are vectors of parameters, and efs are 
disturbance terms which are independently and identically 
distributed across the sample with zero means and constant 
variances (denoted cPj j=l,...,4). 
Substitution of each worker's wage equation into (7) and (8) 
yields reduced form mobility equations: 
Jo = #0*0 + *o (15) 
If ~ 2f "t ^'f (16) 
The v's are normally distributed error terms with zero means, 
constant variances denoted and and covariance We 
normalize (15) and (16), dividing by and oy», respectively. 
Thus the mobility decision criteria become 
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4 
1 if x0 >-d0Z0 
< (17) 
0 otherwise 
0 otherwise 
1 if Vf>-SfZf 
(18) 
where Sa = <£/cr0*, 8f = , 
Defining normalized disturbance term in the lnfF4 equations as 
v4 = for the subgroup S4, we can have the following covariance 
matrix of disturbance terras among vQ, and v4. 
1 Po4 P/4 
£ - Po4 1 Po4 
P/4 Po4 1 
(19) 
The normalized covariance, Pof, measures the correlation between 
unobservables in the reduced form. Thus nonzero correlation 
implies the possibility that the unobservables in the propensity 
to change occupations simultaneously affect the likelihood of 
interfirm mobility. 
The model described here corrects self-selection bias. Self 
selection is present if there exist unobservable factors that 
simultaneously affect both the worker’s propensity of mobility and 
subsequent wage. In that case we observe only the self-selected 
wage. Unless we correct the wage models, we obtain biased 
estimates. 
4. Estimation Procedure 
The model described above is characterized by a full 
information on the outcome of two selection rules, giving four 
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distinct subgroups. The probability Pj (where j=l,...,4) that an 
individual with explanatory variables Yj will fall into the fh 
subsample is given by: 
P\ =P(Io=0,If = 0) = P(v0<-80Z0, vf<-SfZf) = G{-cot-cf -pof) (20) 
P2 = P (4= \7If~ 0) = P( vc >-80Z0, Vf < -SfZf) = G(cot-Cf ;-pQf) (21) 
Pi = PUo = 0, // = 1) = P(v0<-5oZo> Vf>-8fZf) = G(-C0, Cf\-pQf) (22) 
A ~ P U i/ = 1) = P(v0>-80Z0, Xf >-SfZf) = G(c0, Cf9p0f) (23) 
where G( ; pcy) denotes the standard bivariate normal 
distribution function with zero means and unit variance and 
correlation coefficient ±paf and c0--80Z0, Cf = - SfZf. With IQ and 
If observed for everyone, equation (20)-(23) depict a bivariate 
probit structure. The likelihood function for the relevant 
structure is 
p ~n^(~—Pop)'n^(co»——Pop)*n^(~co> cf»~Pof)*cf = Pof) (24) 
$ s, s, SA 
The main objective of this study is to estimate wage 
equations for the subgroups in <S^ to S4. The wage equation for S4 
having complete observations may be written as: 
EQn.WA\Yt,T) = UYi + E{et\YA,T) (25) 
where the conditioning argument T denotes the joint outcome of the 
two selection rules, or the sample selection regimes. 
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If the E(eA\YAi T)*Q, the linear regression of tofF4 on Y4 in 
the subsample S4 will result in inconsistent parameters, or 
selectivity bias. Consistent estimation of parameters requires 
knowledge of the form of the conditional expectation on the right 
hand side, hence the conditional distribution of the error term. 
This calls for imposing additional structure on the model. 
Under trivariate normal specification, the probability 
density function for InWj may be computed for each group. For 
example, assuming complete observations on the equation lnFF4 are 
available for the subgroup SA, where l0- 1 and If-1: 
/(hr414 =i, if =i) = 1 J J — h(v0, vf,r*r*) dva dvf 
** -r. -r °4 °4 
(26) 
Cf "Co 
where h(; ; -)16 is the trivariate normal density for disturbance 
terms. 
Suppose that we observe \nW4 if and only if Ia = 1 and If = 1. 
Indexing II by S., product operator for the observations in the Ith 
subsample, the likelihood function is: 
ls = ~cf* Pof)'lie(c0,-Cf,-p0f)'(-co» c/>-p0f) 
S\ S3 S3 
FT 1 ( [ 1 is to ^4 ~ \ J J / 97 \ •II—-J J — h(v0, Vf, - )dv0dvf (27) 
S4 M -c} -c0 °4 °4 
Subject to identifiability, one can estimate the parameters of 
16The last term in the parenthesis corresponds to v4 (£4 
divided by (TA) which represents the normalized disturbance term in 
hifV4 equation (14). 
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wage equations consistently along with the parameters of two 
selection equations and the matrix £ (19) by maximizing the 
likelihood function (27). The complexity of this function makes 
full information maximum likelihood procedure difficult or even 
intractable when the number of parameters to be estimated is 
large. In addition, if the covariance terms between error terms 
in the probit equations, p^ and p]0, j = 1, . . . 4 , in the proposed 
model were nonzero, least squares estimates would be biased and 
inconsistent. With these factors in mind, we turn to 
computationally simpler two-step procedure described by Maddala 
(1983; pp. 278-283). As before, for the purpose of illustration, 
I take the condition defining observability on \nW4 to be if and 
only if f0>0 and 7^->0. For this case, equation (25) can be 
rewritten as 
E (ln»T41 Yt, T) = nrA + E (e4 I v0 > vf>-cf) (28) 
Given the trivariate normal specification, the conditional 
expectation on the right hand side is 
E(s 4| Vc >-c0. = Po4 
f(c0)F(c}) f(c/)F(c*) 
pfl 
Pa 
~PoA^l+P/A^2 (29) 
where /(•) and F(-) denote the standard univariate normal density 
and distribution functions respectively, 
• co~Pofcf * _ cf ~Pof co 
C°=^W' c/ = u 
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P4 is as defined in equation (23), and 
/ (Cg) F(cf ) f(c/)F(cJ 
Xl = -P-> h. ~ -p- (30) 
M M 
The two A*s constitute the double-selection analogues of the 
inverse-Mill's ratio that arises in the context of a single 
selection. Using (24) in (22), the regression equation that takes 
explicit account of the fact that \nW4 is observed only for the 
individuals in subsample S4 becomes 
In = Y\Y4 + pQ4 + py4 A2 + e4 (31) 
where E (e4|/0 = 1, Ifo = 1)=0. To estimate equation (31) we use a two- 
step estimation procedure. The first step is to estimate the 
reduced-form mobility status equations (17) and (18) with 
bivariate probit, and thus to obtain the likelihood function (24). 
Maximizing the likelihood function will yield consistent estimates 
/n A A ^ ^ /\ 
Soi Sf and p0f, hence c0> Cf> C0-> Cf and Pa- Using these in equation 
✓N A A 
(30), we obtain \ and ^ for each individual in S4. Inserting \ 
and A2 into (31) we get 
A A ^ 
In W4 = y4Y4 + p^X1 + PpX.2 + €A (32) 
~ A A 
where <?4 = e4 + p^X^ - Ai) + p^{X^-fa) . The next step is to fit 
A A 
linear regression of InW4 on Y4, Aj and Aj for the individuals in 
S4. Consistency of the coefficient estimates follows from 
A 
consistency of )|/s. In similar fashion, wage equations for the 
remaining regimes are estimated after inserting the appropriate 
selectivity terms. 
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B. Description of Data 
The proposed model will be estimated with data from The 
University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
The PSID is a longitudinal survey of a national sample that 
contains one observation for each person in each year the person 
was in the sample.^7 Although the survey started in 1968, many 
individuals entered the survey in later years. 
The PSID is an uncommonly rich source of information on the 
dynamics of change in people's lives over the eighteen-year period 
and has several advantages for this study. First, because 
mobility can be measured at one-year intervals, the PSID enables 
us to detect a large fraction of all separations that are made. 
Second, because the study followed up respondents annually, it 
discloses whether they changed their occupations or firms along 
with changes in other aspect of their lives. 
We have chosen mobility decision interval from the 1986 
survey to the 1987 survey. The sample contains 3,087 heads of 
households who were employed during the 1986 survey and the 1987 
survey. 
Table 3.1 presents the definition of variables selected for 
the model estimation. The operational definition of employer 
mobility is that employer in 1986 is different from the employer 
•*-7Thus, the PSID excludes members of the initial sample who 
refused to be interviewed in a subsequent year or who could not be 
interviewed - for example, because the person had died or who 
could not be located despite attempts at followup. 
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Table 3.1 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
Age86/87 Years of age in 1986 and 1987. 
Sqage86/87 Age squared. 
Female Dummy variable takes one if female, zero 
otherwise. 
Nonwhite Dummy variable takes one if not white, 
zero otherwise. 
lnW86/87 logarithm of real hourly wage in cents if 
paid hourly or real hourly salary if 
salaried in 1986 and 1987. 
Edu86/87 Years of formal schooling. 
Exp86/87 Years of work experience. 
Sqexp86/87 Experience squared. 
Ten86/87 Years of tenure with current employer. 
Sqten86/87 Tenure squared. 
SMSA8 6/87 Dummy equals one, if size of largest city 
(SMSA) in the county of residence is 
greater than 50,000. 
Union86/87 Dummy equals one if union member, zero 
otherwise. 
Married86/87 Dummy equals one if married, zero 
otherwise. 
Disable86 Dummy equals one if physical or nervous 
condition limits the type of work or 
amount of work, zero otherwise. 
Depend86 Number of dependents of household heads. 
Unemp86 Local unemployment rate in percent 
Ocdem86 Percentage change of actual occupational 
employment nationally in two digit 
occupational classification between 
January 1986 and January 1987. 
51 
in 1987, whether or not unemployment intervenes. Occupational 
mobility is defined as a change in two-digit occupation 
classification code in the survey of 1986 from the one reported 
for the 1987 survey. For each individual we record the binary 
indicator If = 1 if identified as an employer separation, zero 
otherwise; I0 = 1 if occupational mobility occurred. 
C. Model Specification 
In the next chapter, we report estimates of the 
specifications reported in Table 3.2. This specification 
satisfies conditions for identification, which require that each 
probit equation contain at least one variable not included in the 
log wage equation and at least one variable not contained in the 
other probit equation. 
In the framework outlined in the previous section we suggest 
that the mobility status equations include variables that measure 
the worker's earnings capacity, along with indicators of specific 
human capital. The model provides several testable hypotheses 
regarding the parameters in equations (20)-(23). Age, experience 
and tenure with their squares are included in the model to control 
for human capital. The deterrent effect of age on migration has 
appeared in many studies in a strong negative form. This age 
effect in occupational and employer mobility may not be as 
significant as in geographical mobility where more moving costs 
are always involved. Still a negative relation between age and 
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Table 3.2 
Variables Included in the Model Specifications 
Equation Variables 
Occupational Mobility 
Probit 
Ag 086, Sqage86, Exp86, Sqexp86, Ten86, 
Sqten86, Edu86, SMSA86, Union86, 
Married86, Nonwhite, Female, Disable86, 
Depend86, Quit, Layoff, Ocdem86 
Employer Mobility Age86, Sqage86, Exp86, Sqexp86, Ten86, 
Probit Sqten86, Edu86, SMSA86, Union86, 
Married86, Nonwhite, Female, Disable86, 
Depend86, Unemp86 
Log Wage Equation Age87, Sqage87, Exp87, Sqexp87, Ten87, 
Sqten87, Edu87, Union87, Nonwhite, 
Female, SMSA87 
mobility is expected. Tenure is included to control for firm- 
specific human capital. Workers who have accumulated more time in 
a given occupation and with a given employer are less willing, 
ceteris paribus, to relinquish their stocks of firm-specific 
capital because firm-specific training increases productivity on 
the current job; we expect the sign of tenure with current 
employer to be negative. 
The variables such as education, experience, number of 
dependents, and physical disability of household heads jointly 
proxy the likely value of other jobs and mobility cost. On the one 
hand, education and experience should be directly related to the 
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value of alternative occupations and jobs, and thus positively 
related to the mobility probability; on the other hand, more 
educated and experienced workers may have also searched more 
efficiently prior to the current job, thus achieving a better job 
match with less likelihood of occupational and employer 
separation. Thus we are unable to sign the coefficients on those 
variables a priori. Number of dependents and physical disability 
are assumed to have a negative effect on mobility. We expect a 
positive sign on the SMSA coefficient, because those who live in a 
larger city may have more options for alternative employment. 
Evidence on the mobility by race is mixed, thus the sign of 
nonwhite variable is ambiguous, a priori. Usually females appear 
to be less mobile than males due to their tendency to assume 
dependent roles in the family. Union status captures some aspect 
of individual productivity but probably also indicates the 
presence of other valuable job characteristics such as pension 
plan, seniority rights, and grievance procedures that lower the 
incidence of employer separation (Freeman, 1980). 
Two variables, changes in occupational employment (Ocdem86) 
and local unemployment rate (Unemp86), are included in the probit 
equations in part for identification purpose. At least one 
independent variable must appear in each probit equation that is 
not in the other. Ocdem86 is included only in the occupational 
mobility probit to reflect the effect of actual occupational 
demand on occupational mobility. Thus we can expect that the sign 
of this variable should be positive. Unemp86 is included only m 
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the employer mobility probit to reflect local labor market 
condition. 
The log wage equation includes age, experience and tenure 
with their squares to measure the effects of general and specific 
human capital. The estimated coefficients of age and age square 
are expected to be positive and negative, respectively. The 
coefficients of experience and tenure are expected to be 
positively related to the wage rate. Education is included 
following standard practice to control for schooling and later 
general human capital complementaries. Nonwhites and Females are 
expected to have lower wage profiles, as is commonly suggested by 
previous studies. Union members appear to be economically better 
protected by just being a member. Living in relatively large city 
(SMSA area) may give more and better job opportunities and have a 
positive impact on wages. Thus we expect the positive 
coefficients of union87 and SMSA87. In addition, we include 
selectivity terms of occupational mobility and employer separation 
in the log wage equation. 
In the probit equations we hypothesize that mobility 
decisions are motivated by the worker's perceived growth 
opportunities in his present status. Accordingly in the log wage 
equation we seek to determine whether realized growth outcomes 
affect the worker's wage subsequent to his mobility decision. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF SAMPLE DATA FROM THE PSID AND MODEL ESTIMATION 
A. Analysis of Sample Data from the PSID 
1. Patterns of Occupational Mobility and Employer Separation 
In the previous chapter, we suggested some possible 
interactions between occupational mobility and employer 
separation. In this subsection, we analyze the data to identify 
whether there exist systematic interactions between occupational 
mobility and employer separation and to see the mobility trends 
in the different age groups. 
The data set used for the analysis is the PSID. It consists 
of 3,087 heads of households aged 18-64 who were employed for 
pay. Individuals are observed during the period 1986-1987. 
Table 4.1 presents the rates of occupational mobility and 
employer separation by ages groups. 
The annual mean rate of occupational mobility, using PSID 
two-digit occupational classification, is around 0.297. As can be 
seen in the column of changed occupation of Table 4.1, this rate 
decreases with age, from 0.4161 for ages 18-24 to 0.2074 for the 
ages 35-39 though the rate rises for ages 40 to 50. The decline 
of occupational mobility appears to be dramatic for younger 
workers. In addition. Table 4.1 reports the rate of employer 
mobility along with the rates of quit and layoff for the whole 
sample and by age groups. The annual mean rate of employer 
mobility is around 0.162 which is lower than occupational mobility 
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rate. The rate of employer mobility decreases gradually from 
0.343 for ages 18-14 to 0.091 for ages 55-59. While the layoff 
rate declines gradually with age, the quit rate decreases sharply 
until ages 50-54 and then rises just prior to the conventional 
retirement age. The quit rate seems high at early stage of 
individual's working career and is higher than the layoff rate 
especially for younger workers. The declining trend of 
Table 4.1 
Rates of Occupational Mobility and Employer Mobility 
by Age Groups: Ages 18-64, Heads of Households. 
Age N 
Changed 
occupation 
Changed 
Employer Quit Layoff 
18-24 274 0.4161 0.3431 0.2445 0.0985 
25-29 566 0.3498 0.2173 0.1537 0.0636 
30-34 672 0.2842 0.1726 0.1205 0.0521 
35-39 516 0.2074 0.1240 0.0891 0.0349 
40-44 302 0.2881 0.0993 0.0497 0.0497 
45-49 253 0.3004 0.0988 0.0672 0.0277 
50-54 218 0.3119 0.0917 0.0642 0.0275 
55-59 199 0.2814 0.0905 0.0452 0.0452 
60-64 87 0.2184 0.1379 0.1034 0.0345 
Total 3087 0.2967 0.1623 0.1118 0.0505 
occupational mobility and employer separation (especially quits) 
among younger workers may be due to the fact that upon completion 
of school, young persons often try several fields of employment 
before settling into a career, or they may change their residence 
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or living arrangements. In addition, this trend may reflect job 
matching because occupational matching and employer matching are 
typical in the early stages of a working career. The generally 
decreasing trend of interfirm mobility with age can be explained 
by firm specific investment in human capital. Because of specific 
human capital accumulated within the firm, the mobility rates 
decrease with the time spent in the firm. Thus, both quits and 
layoffs can be expected to decrease with age. 
Table 4.2 presents the rates of occupational mobility for 
workers who changed or did not change their employers. On the 
Table 4.2 
Rates of Occupational Mobility for Workers 
Who Changed/Did Not Change the Employer 
SAMPLE: EMPLOYER . CHANGED 1 EMPLOYER NOT CHANGED 
Changed 1 Changed 
Age N Occupation 1 N Occupation 
18-24 94 .6064 180 .3167 
25-29 123 .5366 443 .2980 
30-34 116 .5086 556 .2374 
35-39 64 .4688 452 . 1704 
40-44 30 .5000 272 .2647 
45-49 24 .7083 229 .2576 
50-54 20 . 6000 198 .2828 
55-59 18 . 6667 181 .2431 
60-64 12 .5833 75 .1600 
TOTAL 501 . 5489 2586 .2479 
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average, 0.5489 of workers who change employer also change 
occupation. This ratio decreases with age, from 0.6064 for ages 
18-24, to 0.4688 for ages 35-39, and increases later, but the 
ratio drops at the end. 
Among workers who do not change their employers, the mean 
rate of occupational mobility is 0.2479, decreasing from 0.3167 
for ages 18-14 to 0.1704 for ages 35-39. The rate of occupational 
mobility declines steadily for younger workers, levels off at ages 
40-49, and drops again at the ages for 60-64. 
2. Descriptive Statistics from the PSID 
Table 4.3 presents sample means of selected variables for 
different separation categories. Employer movers are 
approximately thirty three years old and tend to be younger 
compared to thirty seven years of grand mean. Within the 
categories of occupational nonmigrants, employer movers are about 
five years younger than employer nonmigrants. Female workers and 
nonwhites are more prone to change their employers. 
The hourly wage data offer useful insights. In 1986, 
employer stayers tend to have higher wage rate on average than 
employer movers. The mean wage of nonmigrants in both occupation 
and employer is $7.60 and is $0.66 higher than $7.28 of grand 
mean. Double movers suffer from the lowest mean wage rate of 
$5.98. In 1987, compared to grand mean of $10.74, the employer 
stayers still enjoy higher mean wage, $10.85 for occupational 
migrants and $11.39 for occupational nonmigrants. In addition. 
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Table 4.3 
Selected Sample Means 
Selection 
Occupation Migrant 
Categories 
Occupat ion Nonmigrant Grand 
Variable Firm Mover Firm Stayer Firm Mover Firm Stayer Mean 
Age 8 6 33.316 37.187 32.951 38.095 37.104 
Sqage86 1228.6 1499.4 1174.2 1561.2 1490.4 
Female 0.2909 0.2293 0.3008 0.2123 0.2293 
Nonwhite 0.3964 0.3869 0.3982 0.3655 0.3751 
Wage86 597.61 712.54 667.01 760.10 728.93 
Wage87 723.63 1085.0 908.85 1139.4 1074.2 
Edu8 6 11.927 12.320 12.792 12.866 12.663 
Edu87 12.691 12.777 12.947 12.878 12.845 
Exp8 6 13.167 16.680 12.588 17.523 16.559 
Sqexp86 281.31 382.96 241.30 412.31 382.02 
Exp87 13.796 17.591 13.088 18.215 17.316 
Sqexp87 300.09 432.97 252.45 446.51 416.45 
Ten86 3.4948 8.7880 2.4926 9.6947 8.4269 
Sqten86 45.732 143.40 22.818 163.31 138.42 
Ten87 0.9615 9.0621 0.9705 10.684 8.7698 
Sqten87 6.9326 141.61 4.5600 183.30 145.84 
SMSA86 0.6400 0.6037 0.5664 0.5959 0.5993 
SMSA87 0.6727 0.6006 0.5487 0.5954 0.5600 
Union86 0.1127 0.2247 0.0974 0.2612 0.2284 
Union87 0.1091 0.2215 0.1150 0.2658 0.2316 
Married86 0.5491 0.6287 0.5044 0.6602 0.6323 
Married87 0.5055 0.6240 0.5221 0.6627 0.6304 
Disable86 0.0764 0.0562 0.0531 0.0581 0.0590 
Depend86 2.8327 2.9719 2.6726 3.0864 
3.0100 
Unemp86 6.4982 6.3463 6.5487 6.7111 
6.6045 
Ocdem86 2.4775 2.4997 2.4624 2.4432 
2.4594 
Sample Size 275 641 226 1945 
3087 
(Percent) 8.91 20.76 7.27 63.01 
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they enjoy faster wage growth than grand mean wage growth: the 
differences in mean wages between 1986 and 1987 are $3.79 for 
occupational nonmigrants, $3.73 for occupational migrants and 
$3.45 for grand mean. In the employer movers category, 
occupational nonmigrants are paid $9.09 and occupational migrants 
$7.24, which are below the grand mean of 1987 wage. Although 
employer movers tend to have lower wages in 1986, among them 
occupational nonmigrants are rewarded with slightly faster wage 
growth: $1.26 for occupational movers and $2.42 for occupational 
stayers. Double movers appear to have the lowest wage and also 
suffer the slowest wage growth, while double stayers enjoy the 
fastest wage growth with the highest wages among all selection 
categories. 
Differences in the education level of workers (Edu86 and 
Edu87) is not pronounced among different categories. The 
occupational nonmigrants have slightly higher education level than 
grand mean in 1986: about 12.8 years of formal education for 
employer movers, 12.87 years for employer stayers, and 12.67 years 
for grand mean. 
More experienced (Exp86 and Exp87) and more tenured workers 
(Ten86 and Ten87) are less likely to change their employers. The 
mean values of experience for employer migrants are still smaller 
than the value for grand mean: 13.17 years for occupational 
migrants, 12.59 years for occupational nonmigrants, and 16.56 
years for grand mean, while employer stayers are more experienced. 
The tenure variable follows the same trend as experience. 
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Comparing all categories based on age, experience, tenure, 
and wage, the younger workers tend to have relatively shorter 
experience and shorter tenure, and thus to be paid less. Among 
all other categories, workers who change employers in the same 
occupation are the youngest but tend to have the highest education 
level. Their educational level seems to reward them with 
relatively higher wage than employer movers in the different 
occupation. 
According to the city size variable (SMSA86), workers in the 
larger cities are more likely to change both occupation and 
employer in 1986: the mean value of 0.64 for double movers and 
0.60 for the whole sample. 
Union members appear not to change their employers. Among 
unionized employer stayers, the mean value of union status 
variable (Union86) for occupational nonmigrants is 0.26 and is 
higher than 0.23 of grand mean. Married workers (Married86) are 
less likely to change their employers. The mean of marital status 
variable is 0.66 for double movers which is greater than 0.63 of 
grand mean, and 0.63 for occupational movers in the same employer. 
Disabled workers are less prone to change both occupation 
and employer compared to grand mean: 0.076 for the stayers in both 
occupation and employer and 0.059 for grand mean. Workers with 
less dependents to support are more likely to change employer. 
Workers who do not change occupation but employer have average 2.7 
dependents and double movers average 2.8, which are less than 3.0 
of grand mean. Unemployment rate in 1986 (Unemp86) is little 
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higher for the group of employer and occupational nonmigrants than 
other groups: 6.7 percent for double movers and 6.6 for grand 
mean, and the national occupational demand for 1986 (Ocdem86) for 
occupational migrant group. 
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B. The Results of Model Estimation 
1. Log Wage Equation with Pooled Sample 
In order to isolate the mobility effects, and as a benchmark 
for further comparison, we present ordinary least squares 
estimates of 1987 log wages in Table 4.4. In this context we view 
the mobility categories as predetermined dummy variables in the 
wage profiles. The variable MM denotes double movers, MS denotes 
occupational migrants and employer nonmigrants, and SM denotes 
occupational nonmigrants and employer migrants. The reference 
group is nonmigrants in both occupation and employer. Estimates 
of the dummy coefficients reveal that the patterns in Table 4.4 
stand up after controlling for other determinants of wages (see 
Table 3.1 for variable definitions). Occupational mobility is 
associated with a downward shift in the wage profile. For workers 
who separate from their employers the decline is approximately 14 
percent and is highly significant.18 For those workers who do not 
separate from their employers the decline is less than 1 percent 
and is significant at the 90 percent level. The coefficient for 
SM is positive, although significant at only 50 percent level, 
meaning that workers who separate from their employers in the same 
occupation the increase is approximately 2 percent. 
The remaining estimates reveal a highly convex age-wage and 
experience-wage relationship, meaning that wage increases at a 
18The percentage effect is calculated from the approximation 
formula expi>-l, where b is the estimated dummy coefficient. 
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Table 4.4 
Estimates of Log Wage Equation: 
Pooled Sample OLSa 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant 5.2081 42.257 
Age 8 7 0.1695E-01 2.540 
Sqage87 -0.2316E-03 -3.249 
Exp87 0.1062E-01 3.162 
Sqexp87 -0.1119E-03 -2.846 
Ten87 0.264 9E-01 8.821 
Sqten87 -0.4 029E-03 -4.340 
Edu87 0.8425E-01 27.399 
Union87 0.18507 10.787 
Nonwhite -0.22112 -14.298 
Female -0.23624 -13.199 
SMSA87 0.11042 7.460 
MM -0.15147 -5.294 
MS -0.2010E-02 -0.113 
SM 0.204 5E-01 0.669 
R2 0.4602 
aDummy variable definitions: MM=1 if 
I0-l and If-1; MS=1 if I0-l and If-0; SM=1 
if Io-0 and If-1; The reference group 
consists of stayers: Io-0 and If-0. 
65 
decreasing rate with age and experience. The tenure effect also 
has a convex relationship with wage and is extremely significant. 
This may be due to the fact that firm-specific human capital is 
accumulated over time, given a successful match, and the returns 
grow over time. 
The coefficients for education and union membership show a 
significantly positive effect on wage. The dummy variables of 
female and nonwhite reveal a familiar pattern of lower wage after 
correcting for mobility. The city size (SMSA87) does have a 
positive and quite significant effect on wage. A possible reason 
for this result is that being in an larger city means more options 
for better job and better wage. 
We note, however, that all of these results must be 
interpreted carefully, since the OLS framework treats the mobility 
variables as exogenous. All these results are preliminary and for 
illustrative purposes. In order to endogenize the mobility 
experience, in the next sections we jointly estimate the model of 
mobility and wage outlined in the previous chapter. 
2. Reduced Form of Bivariate Probit 
In order to estimate log wage functions corrected for self 
selection, first we need to estimate the reduced form of the 
bivariate probit for occupational mobility and employer 
separation. Table 4.5 presents estimates of the reduced form 
bivariate probit. 
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Table 4.5 
Bivariate Probit Estimates: 
Equations (17)—(18) 
Occupational 
Mobility 
Employer 
Mobility 
Variable Coefficient t- -stat. Coefficient t-stat. 
Constant 1.9141 2.912 1.8178 2.818 
Age 8 6 -0.10532 •2.740 -0.9255E-01 -2.174 
Sqage86 0.1229E-03 2.730 0.9856E-03 1.907 
Exp86 0.4434E-01 1.993 O.4647E-01 1.868 
Sqexp86 -0.1091E-02 •2.318 -0.9005E-03 -1.634 
Ten8 6 -0.2450E-01 ■1.348 -0.17369 -14 .118 
Sqten86 0.5795E-03 1.207 0.3864E-02 7.765 
Edu86 -0.6015E-01 •5.864 -0.3640E-01 -3.514 
SMSA86 0.8470E-01 1.631 0.2514E-01 0.392 
Union86 -0.10611 •1.615 -0.33374 -3.703 
Married86 0.3382E-01 0.425 -0.2330E-01 -.227 
Nonwhite -0.1207E-01 ■0.219 0.2816E-01 0.420 
Female 0.3406E-01 0.407 0.11432 1.162 
Disable8 6 0.2311E-01 0.105 0.8511E-01 0.632 
Depend86 -0.1027E-01 -0.520 0.1452E-03 0.005 
Ocdem86 0.4439E-01 2.673 
Unemp86 -0.1271E-01 -1.126 
Quit 0.29909 0.735 
Layoff 0.24841 0.603 
z2 224.67 501. 17 
Rhohat 0.2443 
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Column on© lists ©stimates of ths occupational change parameters, 
and column two gives results for employer change (see Table 3.1 
for variable definitions). 
The coefficient of education is negative and highly 
significant in both categories. This may be due to the fact that 
more educated workers may have searched more efficiently prior to 
current occupation and current employer than less educated 
workers, thus achieving better employer match and occupational 
match. 
The results for variables of rate change in occupational 
demand (Ocdem86) and local area unemployement rate in 1986 
(Unemp86) are noteworthy. The rate change in actual occupational 
demand has a significant and positive effect on occupational 
mobility. Within occupations where occupational demand is 
high, workers are more prone to be mobile. Although not 
significant at a conventional level (significant at 26 percent 
level), the negative effect of local area unemployment rates on 
employer mobility means that workers tend not to change their 
employers during local economy downturn. 
This model includes both age and experience. Despite 
potential collinearity between the two variables, t-statistics are 
still statistically significant, indicating independent effects of 
age and experience in the whole sample. The columns reveal same 
age-mobility profiles. Mobility declines at an increasingly 
moderate rate as age increases, which is similar to the results in 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. Table 4.5 presents convex experience- 
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mobility and concave tenure-mobility profiles. The effect of 
experience is significant in both categories. Tenure effect is 
more significant on employer separation than on occupational 
mobility. This result is predictable because tenure is defined as 
the length time spent with current employer rather than in current 
occupation. Experience and tenure appear to take a portion of 
general (transferable) and specific (nontransferable) human 
capital, respectively, because mobility increases with experience 
and decreases with tenure. 
The effect of city size (SMSA86) is positive and significant 
in both columns, although significant only for occupational 
migrants at 10 percent level. A possible explanation for this 
result is that living in a a relatively large city means more 
alternative occupations and firms to change in the local market. 
The effect of union membership (Union86) is negative and 
significant at 10 percent level on occupational mobility and is 
highly significant on employer mobility. Union seniority 
provisions may discourage union workers from separating their 
employers. The effect of union membership mobility can be 
explained from two aspects. First, the career structure of union 
workers may restrict them to remain in their current occupations. 
Second, typical careers of union members involve occupations in 
which advancement is by changing grade levels within the same 
occupation or moving to a similar occupation within the same 
category. Such movement of union members in general will not 
change their PSID occupational codes in two digit classification. 
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Therefore we can see why employer mobility is affected more by 
union membership than occupational mobility. 
Results in both columns attest to the increased mobility for 
females, although both coefficients are not significant, they are 
positive, which is quite unusual. This result may be possibly 
caused by sample data where all the females included are heads of 
households. That means female heads of households may have a 
similar labor market behavior as their male counterparts. Quit 
and layoff are included in the occupational mobility probit. It 
turns out that these variables are not significant in the model 
after controlling all other explanatory variables. Remaining 
variables are insignificant. 
The estimated correlation between the probit error terms is 
0.244. While this parameter has no economic interpretation, its 
sign is plausible, indicating that workers with unmeasured 
tendencies to change occupations tend to possess unobserved 
propensities to separate employers as well. Finally the Chi 
Square statistics in each column easily reject the null hypotheses 
that the respective coefficient vectors are jointly zero. 
It is worth mentioning that the estimates in Table 4.5 
cannot be interpreted as representing mobility decisions, because 
wage variables are substituted in the mobility decision equations. 
The reduced form of the model should, however, be stressed: The 
influences of many of these factors affecting mobility cannot be 
separated. We use the estimates of reduced form probit to 
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calculate the selectivity terms for both occupational mobility and 
employer separation. 
3. The Second-Stage Log Wage Equations 
As is described in the previous chapter, the second stage of 
the estimation procedure entails construction of bivariate 
selection terms based on the estimated probit coefficients. Log 
wage equations are estimated with OLS after including the 
appropriate selectivity terms as explanatory variables. The 
results are presented in Table 4.6, where SELECT(0) and SELECT(F) 
denote occupation and employer selectivity terms, respectively. 
These estimates differ from the least squares - dummy 
variable results in Table 4.4 in three aspects. First, we allow 
four distinct wage regimes. Second, we permit correlation between 
migrant selection and wage determination. Third, the wage regimes 
possess distinct variances. With these modifications, few of the 
results in Table 4.1 are preserved across migrant regimes. 
The age-wage profile is insignificant in the first three 
categories (significant at above 50 percent level) while it is 
significant at less than 5 percent level in the category of double 
movers. The wage advantages of experience and tenure have been 
considerably diluted. It seems that the collinearity between age 
and experience gets serious in the first three categories after 
the sample is divided into four subsamples, more so than in the 
aggregate wage equation. For workers changing occupations within 
the firm (the second category) the experience effect is the most 
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Table 4.6 
Second-Stage Log Wage: Equations (11) — (14)a 
Se paration Cate gories 
Variable 
Occupational Migrant 
Firm Mover Firm Stayer 
Occupational Nonmigrant 
Firm Mover Firm Stayer 
Constant 4.6793 
(9.935) 
5.2766 
(18.67) 
5.6725 
(5.641) 
5.2398 
(19.13) 
Age 8 7 0.2082E-01 
(0.669) 
0.6162E-02 
(0.375) 
0.1596E-01 
(0.310) 
0.2060E-01 
(2.169) 
Sqage87 -0.294 0E-03 
(-0.767) 
-0.1613E-03 
(-0.902) 
-0.2701E-03 
(-0.390) 
-0.2434E-03 
(-2.434) 
Exp87 0.24 96E-01 
(1.538) 
0.1601E-01 
(2.228) 
0.144 0E-01 
(0.595) 
0.7108E-02 
(1.661) 
Sqexp87 -0.4 975E-03 
(-1.318) 
-0.1601E-03 
(-2.130) 
-0.1447E-03 
(-0.205) 
-0.6575E-04 
(-1.286) 
Ten87 0.4376E-01 
(1.767) 
0.3989E-01 
(4.548) 
0.7832E-01 
(1.941) 
0.6529E-02 
(1.109) 
Sqten87 -0.7314E-03 
(-0.702) 
-0.8044E-03 
(-3.252) 
-0.3826E-02 
(-1.994) 
0.4 81IE-04 
(0.324) 
Edu87 0.11115 
(8.843) 
0.9035E-01 
(9.663) 
0.8241E-01 
(4.552) 
0.8274E-01 
(15.546) 
Female -0.8685E-01 
(-1.879) 
-0.14953 
(-3.599) 
-0.22519 
(-3.229) 
-0.28363 
(-12.01) 
Nonwhite -0.20416 
(-4.643) 
-0.26716 
(-7.306) 
-0.17814 
(-2.869) 
-0.20824 
(-10.78) 
Union87 0.22289 
(3.297) 
0.16189 
(3.777) 
0.21575 
(2.360) 
0.17411 
(7.951) 
SMSA87 0.8596E-01 
(1.859) 
0.16705 
(4.639) 
0.11014 
(1.683) 
0.8302E-01 
(4.265) 
SELECT(0) -0.17371 
(-0.807) 
0.7 67 0E-02 
(0.049) 
-1.5345 
(-3.680) 
-0.33273 
(-1.687) 
SELECT(F) -0.1014E-01 
(-0.176) 
-0.74 88E-01 
(-0.785) 
0.64910 
(2.714) 
0.37547 
(3.381) 
R2 0.463 0.404 0.440 
0.455 
aFigures in the parentheses are t-statistics. 
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®ficant (at less than three percent level) , while workers 
changing only employer (The third category) it is almost 
^-9^-kls• The tenure effect is extremely significant and 
positive among workers who change occupations within the firm and 
is still significant at 5 percent level among workers who change 
only employer. Experience also has a significant and positive 
effect for workers who move occupation within the firm (in the 
second category). It appears that experience and tenure encourage 
intrafirm transfers and promotions from which workers can get a 
wage raise. Interestingly all these variables have a convex 
relationship with wage, except one last category. Their 
coefficients appear to provide a decomposition of worker returns 
to general and specific human capital investment. Because both 
occupation-specific and firm-specific human capitals are 
accumulated over time, given a successful match, and the returns 
grow over time, both the rate of growth of these returns and their 
ultimate level may affect mobility: the tenure effect is 
positively correlated with both. Thus the concavity of tenure- 
mobility (Table 4.5) and convexity in tenure-wage profiles (Table 
4.6) may be due to the eventual completion of occupation-specific 
and/or firm-specific capital accumulation in the firm. 
The education effect still remains positive and the most 
significant in all categories among other variables, although it 
is quite weakened compared to the aggregate wage equation. More 
educated workers tend to have more opportunity for wage raise. 
The coefficients of female and nonwhite are negative and extremely 
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significant, meaning that nonwhites and females are likely to have 
the usual wage disadvantage. The coefficients of union membership 
is positive and very significant. Thus union workers seem to be 
economically better protected by virtue of union membership. The 
coefficients of city size are extremely significant for employer 
nonmigrants, while it is still significant at less than 10 percent 
level for employer migrants. The size of city where workers live 
does have a significant effect on the wage rates they are paid. 
Thus living in a relatively larger city seems to give wage 
advantages especially to employer nonmigrants. 
Self selection is significant in the categories of 
occupational nonmigrant (categories three and four in Table 4.6). 
Table 4.7 summarizes the effects of self selection in the 
different migrant regimes. 
For employer movers the subsample means of both selectivity 
terms are positive: 0.585 for occupation term and 0.707 for 
employer term. The effects of self selection, as measured by the 
product of the coefficient and the subsample mean, are negative 
for the occupational term and positive for the employer term. We 
interpret this to mean that, within the category where workers 
change their employers but not their occupations, those who 
possess unmeasured tendencies to change occupation suffer from 
unmeasured wage disadvantages by changing it, while workers who 
possess unmeasured tendencies to separate employers enjoy 
unmeasured wage advantages by doing so. For employer stayers the 
sample means are both negative; -0.424 for occupational term and 
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Table 4.7 
The Effects of Self Selection 
in the Different Migrant Regimes 
SELECT(0) SELECT(F) 
Occupation Employer Coefficient Mean Effecta Coefficient Mean Effecta 
Move Move -0.174 0.798 -0.139 -0.010 1.168 -0.012 
Move Stay -0.008 1.169 -0.009 -0.075 0.346 -0.026 
Stay Move -1.535** 0.585 -0.898 0.649* 0.707 0.459 
Stay Stay -0.333**-0.424 0.141 0.376** -0.209 -0.079 
aColumn Effect is product of Coefficient and Mean of each 
selectivity terms. 
* Significant at 10 percent level (see Table 4.6). 
Significant at 1 percent level. 
SELECT(0) is a selectivity term for occupational mobility 
and SELECT(F) for employer separation. 
-0.209 for employer term. Thus the effects of self selection are 
positive for the occupational term and negative for the employer 
term. Within the category of stayers both in occupation and 
employer, workers who possess unmeasured tendencies not to change 
their occupations enjoy wage advantages by staying, while workers 
who possess unmeasured tendencies not to separate their employers 
suffer wage disadvantages by staying. Other selectivity 
coefficients are not significant at conventional levels of 
significance. 
In order to compare the wage profiles, we measure the 
regression corrected percentage wage gap (M7) between each regime 
and reference group, double stayers: 
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WGj = exp {Xj (,bj-b4)} - 1, j = 1, 2, 3 
where A'; denotes the average vector of explanation for regime j, 
and bj denotes the vector of estimated wage coefficients for 
regime j, b4 denotes the estimates of reference group. This 
statistic summarizes differences between regime j and the 
reference group subject to the condition that both groups are 
endowed with the average characteristics of group j 
The calculated WG is 0.212 for double movers, 0.645 for only 
occupational migrant (intrafirm transfers and promotions), and - 
0.605 for only employer migrants. Overall within the category of 
occupational migrants, workers appear to enjoy efficient economic 
returns, although they can be still better off by not changing 
employers than changing. We can see wage deficiency of workers 
who end up with the same occupation with different employer. All 
of this may have something to do with the individual circumstances 
leading to mobility, which are impossible to determine from the 
data. 
These results are quite interesting compared to the wage 
differentials between 1986 and 1987 in Table 4.3 and the dummy 
coefficients of MM, MS and SM in Table 4.4. Because the condition 
for the wage gap calculation is that both the reference group and 
group j have the average characteristics of group j, the result is 
different from the results in the Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Thus simple 
analysis of raw data and OLS estimation are misleading here. 
■^Another application of this statistic is found in 
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1988). 
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Analysis of raw data does not sufficiently account for differences 
in measurable characteristics within regimes, while OLS estimation 
does not account for differences in unmeasurable characteristics. 
Overall, selectivity significantly affects occupational 
nonmigrants. However, wage differentials between reference group 
and occupational migrants groups are significant, especially for 
those who get promoted or transfer within a firm. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Workers mobility is an important component of the process 
whereby markets adapt to change. Based on the job matching and 
specific human capital framework, this study is primarily 
concerned with simultaneous treatment of occupational mobility and 
interfirm mobility, and their effects on the subsequent earnings 
profile. This study focuses on workers' decisions to change 
occupations and employers. We assume that workers behave as if 
they monitor their expected earnings from continued employment in 
their present positions. Earnings are presumed to be a function 
of variables that describe the worker's productivity and prospects 
for future wage growth. 
Our framework gives rise to three principal items of 
concern. First, we seek evidence on variables that influence 
interfirm and occupational mobility decisions. Second, we examine 
the post-mobility wage profiles, seeking evidence of discrepancies 
across migrant regimes. Finally, we look for evidence of self 
selection in the migrant decision process. 
Our model consists of a bivariate probit equations 
describing the worker's mobility status along with a wage equation 
corresponding to each possible outcome of the selection process. 
The education variable is found to have a negative and very 
significant effect on the decision to change occupations and 
employers. This result suggests that more educated workers may 
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have searched more efficiently prior to current position than less 
educated workers, thus achieving better employer match or 
occupational match. The rate change in actual occupational demand 
has a significant and positive effect on occupational mobility. 
It seems plausible because within the occupation where 
occupational demand is high, workers tend to have more 
opportunities to move. 
Our probit results support the human capital hypothesis. As 
workers accumulate occupation-specific and firm-specific human 
capital in their current firms, they become less likely candidates 
for separation. These results are also consistent with the 
hypothesis that low quality matches between workers and 
occupations or employers are likely to be discovered in their 
early stage of career, leading to separations by the more poorly 
matched workers. 
Our estimates of the second-stage wage equation (Table 4.6) 
differ from the estimates of pooled OLS wage equation (Table 4.4) 
in three aspects. First, we allow four distinct wage regimes. 
Second, we permits correlation between migrant selection and wage 
determination. Third, the wage regimes possess distinct 
variances. 
The tenure effect is highly significant among workers who 
change occupations within the firm and among workers who change 
only employer. Experience has also a significant effect 
especially for workers who change only occupations. Experience 
and tenure appear to encourage intrafirm transfers and promotions 
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from which workers can get a wage raise. In almost all mobility 
categories age, experience and tenure have a convex relationship 
with wage. Their coefficients appear to provide a decomposition 
of worker returns to general and specific human capital 
investment. Because both occupation-specific and firm-specific 
human capitals are accumulated over time, given a successful 
match, and the returns grow over time, both the rate of growth of 
these returns and their ultimate level may affect mobility: the 
tenure effect is positively correlated with both. Thus the 
concavity of tenure-mobility (Table 4.5) and convexity in tenure- 
wage profiles (Table 4.6) may be due to the eventual completion of 
occupation-specific and/or firm-specific capital accumulation in 
the firm. 
Based on the results from wage gap calculations, we find 
that within the category of occupational migrants, workers enjoy 
efficient economic returns, although they can be still better off 
by not changing employers than changing (intrafirm transfers and 
promotions). We can see the wage deficiency of workers who end up 
with the same occupation with a different employer. This result 
is conflicting with the wage differentials between 1986 and 1987 
in Table 4.3 and the dummy coefficients of MM, MS and SM in Table 
4.4. It is apparent that simple analysis of raw data and OLS 
estimation can be misleading in this study. 
Our model permits the possibility of endogeneous selection 
of mobility status and wage. Self selection manifests itself in a 
manner that cannot be casually observed. It arises as a 
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correlation between unmeasured characteristics in the worker’s 
propensity to migrate and his subsequent wage rate. We find 
evidence of self selection in occupational nonmigrants. The 
effects of self selection, as measured by the product of the 
coefficient and the subsample mean, are negative for the 
occupation term and positive for the employer term. We interpret 
this to mean that, within the category where workers change their 
employers but not their occupations, those who possess unmeasured 
tendencies to change occupation suffer from unmeasured wage 
disadvantages by changing it, while workers who possess unmeasured 
tendencies to separate employers enjoy unmeasured wage advantages 
by doing so. For employer stayers, the effects of self selection 
are positive for the occupation term and negative for the employer 
term. Within the category of stayers both in occupations and 
employers, workers who possess unmeasured tendencies not to change 
their occupations enjoy wage advantages by staying, while workers 
who possess unmeasured tendencies not to separate their employers 
suffer wage disadvantages by staying. 
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